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Abstract 
Scientific uncertainty surrounds biotech foods. To regulate such foods and to ensure consumer 
choice and safety, the EU has adopted a precautionary approach based on premarket authorization 
and mandatory labelling. Despite these regulatory requirements, the controversial concept of 
substantial equivalence is still present within the existing regimes for GM and cloned foods. The 
concept uses a comparative analysis of conventional and biotech foods to assess their safety. If 
substantial equivalence is present, biotech foods are regulated in the same manner as conventional 
foods. The concept restricts consumer choice and calls into question the safety of such foods 
because it requires no specific mandatory labelling or traceability and only minimal premarket 
authorization. The dynamic between substantial equivalence and the precautionary principle is 
problematic as the two concepts seem contradictory. This situation prevents the existence of an 
adequate and efficient regulatory environment for EU biotech foods regulation and undermines a 
comprehensive precautionary approach towards such foods and the EU food system in general.  
 
Introduction 
Modern agricultural biotechnologies, such as genetic modification and animal cloning, and their 
resulting products, have been identified as part of the solution to deliver food security and 
sustainability through environmental and food applications.1 Both plant and animal agricultural 
biotechnologies have similar aims – to produce superior crops or animals by eliminating 
undesirable traits, passing on desirable ones through successive generations, and improving yield.2 
For instance, a genetically engineered salmon, the AquAdvantage™ salmon, which can grow to a 
                                                 
 
Lecturer in Law. School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University. Email: PetetinL@cardiff.ac.uk. 
1 Generally on food security and sustainability issues, see e.g. Commission Communication, “The CAP towards 
2020: Meeting the Food, Natural Resources and Territorial Challenges of the Future” COM(2010)672 final; and 
European Commission, “Sustainable Agriculture for the Future We Want” (2012).  
2 See e.g. National Academies of Sciences, “Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects” (2016).  
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mature size in almost half the time of its natural counterpart, has been developed by AquaBounty 
Technologies and was approved for commercialisation in the US in 2015.3  
The EU has opted for the precautionary principle to diminish potential risks created by 
biotech foods.4 Unknown long-term effects of consuming biotech foods on humans, including 
nutritional differences, new diseases developed in the human gut and allergic reactions5 raise 
uncertainty.6 Within EU food law, the central role played by the precautionary principle in cases 
of scientific uncertainty for foods has forced decision-makers to act carefully and with foresight 
when making decisions related to biotech foods, and by so doing potentially prohibit such foods 
from being marketed in the EU.7 It would appear that the precautionary principle has become a 
linchpin in the regulation of biotech foods. Cloned and GM foods are regulated under distinctive 
regimes. The authorization, labelling and traceability requirements for GM foods are harmonized 
by two complementary regulations, the Food and Feed Regulation and the Traceability Regulation.8 
From 1 January 2018, the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation will update the regulatory framework for 
novel foods,9 inclusive of cloned foods, and repeal the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation, which also 
deals with cloned foods.10  
A careful examination of the biotech regulatory regimes reveals that the older and more 
controversial concept of substantial equivalence is still present in the regulation of biotech foods. 
                                                 
 
3 Food and Drug Administration, “FDA Has Determined That the AquAdvantage Salmon is as Safe to Eat as Non-
GE Salmon” (19 November 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm472487.htm 
[Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
4 For the purpose of this article, biotech foods are foods resulting from three types of modern agricultural 
biotechnologies: genetically modified plant organisms (GMOs), animal cloning, and genetically engineered animals 
(GEAs). 
5 See e.g. the following US case, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation 212 F Supp 2d 828 (ND Ill 2002). 
6 See e.g. A. Coghlan, “Enter the Superweed” New Scientist (27 August 2005) 17; and L.L. Wolfenbarger and P.R. 
Phifer, “The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants” (2000) 290 Science 2088.  
7  The 2002 General Food Law enshrines the first definition of the precautionary principle within EU law and 
establishes the principle as overarching and applicable in all food safety legislation. See Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the General Principles and 
Requirements of Food Law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down Procedures in Matters 
of Food Safety [2002] OJ L31/1 [hereinafter General Food Law]. For more on the role of the precautionary principle 
in the EU regulation of foods, see e.g. A. Szajkowska, Regulating Food Law: Risk Analysis and the Precautionary 
Principle as General Principles of EU Food Law (Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2012). 
8 Respectively Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 
on Genetically Modified Food and Feed [2003] OJ L268/1 [hereinafter Food and Feed Regulation]; and Regulation 
(EC) 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 concerning the Traceability 
and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products produced from 
Genetically Modified Organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC [2003]OJ L268/24 [hereinafter Traceability 
Regulation]. 
9 Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on Novel Foods 
[2015] OJ L 327/1 [hereinafter 2015 Novel Foods Regulation]. 
10 Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning Novel 
Foods and Novel Food Ingredients [1997] OJ L43/1 [hereinafter 1997 Novel Foods Regulation]. When it entered into 
force, the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation covered genetically modified (GM) foods. Since 2004, GM foods have been 
removed from its scope and fall under the scope of the Food and Feed Regulation and the Traceability Regulation. 
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Substantial equivalence was developed in the 1990s as a risk assessment method.11 If substantial 
equivalence is present between two foods, no other premarket authorization and no specific 
labelling is required for biotech foods.12 The concept prevailed at an international level and was 
subsequently used at a national level. Substantial equivalence swiftly became a pillar of risk 
regulation for modern agricultural biotechnology and the benchmark standard against which the 
safety of biotech foods in the EU would be assessed.13 The EU embraced the concept in the 1997 
Novel Foods Regulation.14 However, substantial equivalence significantly restricts consumer 
choice by requiring no specific mandatory labelling and no traceability. It also brings into questions 
the safety of biotech products if they only undergo minimal premarket authorization. Because of 
these issues, substantial equivalence is a concept that has been the subject of much criticism.  
This article examines the problematic dynamic between the concept of substantial 
equivalence and the precautionary principle, including the issues of safety and consumer choice. It 
is argued that both the precautionary principle and substantial equivalence still interplay in the 
field, despite an apparent and formal departure from substantial equivalence. The second section 
assesses how the EU has moved away from the controversial concept of substantial 
equivalence under the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation to supposedly enshrine the 
precautionary principle in the framework for biotech foods. The third section argues that 
there is an unsubstantiated claim of departure from substantial equivalence under the 
existing regimes for biotech foods. It assesses how the constraints created by substantial 
equivalence prevent the precautionary principle from playing a comprehensive role in the 
risk regulation for biotech foods. The fourth section indicates that the dominance of 
substantial equivalence in the frameworks impacts on consumer safety and choice. The final 
section concludes that the dynamic but problematic interaction between the precautionary 
principle and substantial equivalence undermines the EU framework for biotech foods.  
 
From “Substantial Equivalence” to “Precaution”  
The Scientific and Regulatory Roles of Substantial Equivalence and their criticism  
                                                 
 
11 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) wanted to develop a risk assessment 
method that would liberalize trade in biotech products and favour regulatory harmonization. See OECD, “Safety 
Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology: Concepts and Principles” (OECD, 1993) 14. The concept 
was first used in a US document. See FDA, “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties” (1992) 
57 Fed Reg 22984. It was then appropriated by the OECD and other international organizations. 
12 See Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/ World Health Organization (WHO), “Expert Consultation on 
Biotechnology and Food Safety” (FAO/WHO, 1996); and FAO/WHO, “Expert Consultation on Foods derived from 
Biotechnology” (FAO/WHO, 2000).  
13 For more on risk regulation see E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010); J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); and C.R. Sunstein, Laws of 
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
14Art.3(4) 1997 Novel Foods Regulation.  
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In the 1990s, substantial equivalence became “an internationally recognized standard” to 
undertake safety assessments.15 The concept is built on the premise that a conventional food can 
be used as the “basis for comparison when assessing the safety of human consumption of a food 
[...] that has been modified or is new”.16 Substantial equivalence, as a scientific concept, is 
composed of two elements. First, substantial equivalence is based on an assumption of equivalence 
and risk between biotech and conventional foods. The aim is not to establish an absolute level of 
safety, but to ensure with a “reasonable certainty” that no harm to public health and the environment 
results from new food products.17 The reasoning is that modern biotechnology does not 
automatically result in foods which are “less safe than those developed by conventional 
techniques”.18 In other words, biotech foods are not risk-free; they simply involve the same types 
of risks to human health and food safety as conventional foods. The FAO and WHO also confirmed 
that substantial equivalence was the “most practical approach to address the safety evaluation” of 
biotech foods.19 It is part of the safety assessment for biotech foods and this assessment is framed 
as a positive scientific approach that favours this type of foods. Nonetheless, it seems bizarre 
to assume that a novel type of food be considered as safe as a traditional food that would have 
been consumed for the last hundreds or thousands of years. 
Second, substantial equivalence entails a comparative analysis between biotech and 
their conventional counterparts.20 It compares the chemical composition between the biotech 
and the traditional food, as well as the molecular, agronomical and morphological 
characteristics,21 and nutritional (or anti-nutritional) components.22 In the early 2000s, the 
concept was further refined. The 2000 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Foods 
Derived from Biotechnology declared that the concept should be used “to identify similarities 
and differences”.23 The aim is to determine if the biotech food presents any new or greater 
risks in comparison with its traditional counterpart without affecting the health or 
nutritional status of consumers.24 The frame of this comparative analysis element of 
substantial equivalence is more neutral and does not favour biotech foods.    
Not only is substantial equivalence a scientific assessment but it also plays a role during the 
regulatory stage of biotech food regulation.25 If biotech foods are substantially equivalent to 
                                                 
 
15 Council for Biotechnology Information, “Substantial Equivalence in Food Safety Assessment” (Council for 
Biotechnology Information, 2001).  
16 OECD, “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology” (OECD, 1993) 11. See also FAO/WHO, 
“Expert Consultation on Foods derived from Biotechnology” (FAO/WHO, 2000).  
17 L.R. Ghisleri and others, “Risk Analysis and GM foods: Scientific Risk Assessment” (2009) 4 European Food and 
Feed Law Review 235, 247. 
18 OECD, “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology” (OECD, 1993) 10. 
19 FAO/WHO, “Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety” (1996) 4. 
20 OECD, “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology” (OECD, 1993) 14. 
21 Ghisleri and others, “Risk Analysis and GM foods” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law Review 235, 241. 
22 OECD, “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology” (OECD, 1993) 11.  
23 FAO/WHO, “Expert Consultation on Foods Derived from Biotechnology” (FAO/WHO, 2000) 4. 
24 Ghisleri and others, “Risk Analysis and GM foods” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law Review 235, 247. 
25 L. Petetin, “The Revival of Modern Agricultural Biotechnology by the UK Government: What Role for Animal 
Cloning?” (2012) 7 European Food and Feed Law Review 296, 305. 
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conventional foods, they are regulated similarly to conventional foods. Substantial equivalence 
is “regulatory shorthand for defining those new foods that do not raise safety issues that 
require special intensive, case by case scrutiny”.26 The decisive criterion is the end-product 
rather than the manufacturing process of foods. The process according to which a food was 
produced is irrelevant. A determination of substantial equivalence between biotech and 
conventional foods reduces the regulatory hurdles at an international level by standardising the risk 
assessment criteria across countries.27  
Substantial equivalence is specifically mentioned under the 1997 Novel Foods 
Regulation.28 Under the regulation, novel foods, including cloned foods, must undergo premarket 
authorization before being placed on the market.29 Commentators have argued that even if the word 
“precaution” is not mentioned in the text of the regulation, the Novel Foods Regulation adopts a 
precautionary approach by establishing a mandatory premarket approval.30 However, substantial 
equivalence is the scientific criterion by which the evaluation of novel foods is weighed when an 
applicant notifies the placing on the market to the national competent authority.31 If a novel food 
is not substantially equivalent to an existing food, the food must undergo an “initial” safety 
assessment by the competent authority of a Member State, and may then proceed to premarket 
authorization.32 An authorization decision is required. On the other hand, if the novel food is 
“substantially equivalent” to an existing food, it falls under the scope of the simplified procedure 
that exists under Art.3(4). In this instance, applicants would simply have to notify the European 
Commission of the placing of the food on the market. No specific premarket approval is required 
to put the novel food on the market. Further, the labelling of novel foods under the scope of the 
1997 Novel Foods Regulation is based on the concept of substantial equivalence. Art.8(1)(a) 
ensures the labelling of a novel food if this food is “no longer equivalent to an existing food”.33 If 
a novel food is declared substantially equivalent to an existing food, no specific labelling is 
required. They are submitted to general labelling requirements.34 
Cloned foods, which fall by default under the regulation, could benefit from the simplified 
procedure under the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation.35 The Commission and national competent 
                                                 
 
26 H.I. Miller, “Substantial Equivalence: Its Uses and Abuses” (1999) 17 Nature Biotechnology 1042, 1042.  
27 See OECD, “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern Biotechnology” (OECD, 1993). 
28 The 1997 Novel Foods Regulation was the first EU regulatory document dedicated to novel foods. It defines novel 
foods, as foods that “have not hitherto been used for human consumption to a significant degree within the 
Community” prior to 15 May 1997. See Art.1(2) 1997 Novel Foods Regulation.  
29 Art.4 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. 
30 See e.g. N. Salmon, “A European Perspective on the Precautionary Principle, Food Safety and the Free Trade 
Imperative of the WTO” (2002) 27 European Law Review 138, 143. 
31 Art.5 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. See also Petetin, “The Revival of Modern Agricultural Biotechnology by the 
UK Government” (2012) 7 European Food and Feed Law Review 296, 304. 
32 Art.4 1997 Novel Foods Regulation.  
33 Art.8(1)(a) 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. 
34 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the 
Provision of Food Information to Consumers [2011] OJ L304/18.  
35 Cloned foods fall under category (e) of Article 1 (2) of the Novel Foods Regulation. Art. 1 (2)(e) Novel Foods 
Regulation states that “foods and food ingredients consisting of or isolated from plants and food ingredients isolated 
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authorities would not be able to prevent applicants from placing their products on the EU market 
as they only have a reactive regulatory role to play. Cloned foods would not require any specific 
labelling. One market combining both cloned and conventional foods would be created, which 
would facilitate the sale of such foods but would reduce consumers’ freedom of choice to a large 
extent as they would not be able to differentiate between a cloned and non-cloned product. The 
burden of testing the existence of substantial equivalence is in the hands of the manufacturers. The 
regulation is an example of how substantial equivalence can give “producers carte blanche to do as 
they please”.36 This degree of “self-determination” for the foods produced by the biotech industry 
leads to self-regulation and raises questions as to the safety of foods placed on the EU market if no 
independent check is undertaken. The regulatory and scientific aspects of substantial 
equivalence and their consequences are visible under the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. It 
must, however, be noted that as of yet no food derived from animal cloning has been placed on the 
EU market. 
Substantial equivalence quickly attracted criticism. Its detractors assert that substantial 
equivalence suffers from significant failings, both as a scientific and regulatory tool; the most 
disturbing aspect of the concept being its subjectivity: “no standardized objective tests for 
determining equivalence and measuring substantiality exist”.37 The term “substantial” is not 
defined so there is uncertainty about when two foods cease to be substantially equivalent. The 
concept also starts from the erroneous premise that modern agricultural biotechnology does not 
differ from conventional breeding.38 In particular, the presence of “novelty” in a new plant or 
animal seems to be in total contradiction with a designation of “equivalence”.39 Findings of 
equivalence also result in concerns. A biotech food which has been declared substantially 
equivalent to a conventional food will not have undergone a full safety assessment and will not be 
labelled and therefore be untraceable, thus creating potential food safety problems and significantly 
limiting consumer choice. For Ho and Steinbrecher, substantial equivalence is devised to 
“expedite product approval” with little regard for safety”.40  
Almost immediately after the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation came into force, the regime 
started to be affected by comparable criticism that was developed at the time against substantial 
equivalence. Despite claiming to be precautionary, a rigorous analysis of the text and mechanisms 
of the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation demonstrate that substantial equivalence is expressly placed 
                                                 
 
from animals, except for foods and food ingredients obtained by traditional propagating or breeding practices and 
having a history of safe food use”. 
36 M.W. Ho and R.A. Steinbrecher, “Fatal Flaws in Food Safety Assessment: Critique of the Joint FAO/WHO 
Biotechnology and Food Safety Report” (1998) 2 Environmental & Nutritional Interactions 51 (specifically referring 
to substantial equivalence).  
37 T.O. McGarity, “Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants” (2002) 35 University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 403, 429. 
38 Ho and Steinbrecher, “Fatal Flaws in Food Safety Assessment” (1998) 2 Environmental & Nutritional Interactions 
51. 
39 McGarity, “Seeds of Distrust” (2002) 35 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 403, 429. 
40 Ho and Steinbrecher, “Fatal Flaws in Food Safety Assessment” (1998) 2 Environmental & Nutritional Interactions 
51.  
7 
 
 
at the heart of the regulation and prevents a truly precautionary approach towards novel foods, 
including cloned foods, both in relation to premarket authorization and labelling. These issues 
led the Novel Foods Regulation (along with the Council Directive 90/220/EEC41) to be at the centre 
of the EU de facto moratorium on the approval of GMOs and their resulting products.42 Most EU 
Member States declared that they were not ready to abandon the moratorium until effective and 
truly precautionary rules on labelling and traceability were adopted.43 The 2015 Novel Foods 
Regulation is a welcome revision to the existing weak regime as the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) can finally play a proactive role in the premarket authorization of novel 
foods.44  
 
Precaution Across the Board – At Last  
From the early 2000s, the EU updated its regimes for biotech foods. It decided to adopt an actual 
process approach (as opposed to an end-product approach) when regulating biotech foods as the 
technological processes behind these foods differ from conventional foods.45 The concept of 
substantial equivalence and the simplified procedure were removed from these regimes as they 
were considered too contentious and artificial.46  
The new and “improved” frameworks for biotech foods constituted by the Food and Feed 
Regulation and the Traceability Regulation for GM foods, and the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation 
for cloned foods, establish much-awaited, strong precautionary EU procedures. Under these 
regimes, the premarket approval of biotech foods is required.47 These regulations create a single, 
efficient and transparent EU procedure for biotech food, a “one door-one key” authorization. 
Independent risk assessment is now centralised and carried out by the competent authority, the 
EFSA. This is a fundamental step in any biotech food authorization.48 This Europeanisation of risk 
                                                 
 
41 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms [1990] OJ L117/15. 
42 From 1998 to 2004, Member States’ opposition meant that GMOs and GM foods were not approved. The de facto 
moratorium was lifted with the entry into force of the Food and Feed Regulation and the Traceability Regulation. 
The moratorium prompted the World Trade Organization EC-Biotech case. See EC-Biotech: Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006.  
43 The concerns relating to the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation and substantial equivalence were confirmed in the 2003 
Monsanto case. This case dealt indirectly with the simplified procedure of the Novel Foods Regulation. See Case C-
236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others [2003] 
EU:C:2003:431. See especially para 84. 
44 Art.10 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
45 H.T. Anker and M. Grossman, “Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms: Precaution in US and EC Law” 
(2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law Review 13 (specifically referring to GMOs and GM foods). 
46 The preamble of the Food and Feed Regulation declares that “whilst substantial equivalence is a key step in the 
procedure for assessment of the safety of genetically modified foods, it is not a safety assessment in itself” and 
should be abandoned in respect of GM foods. See Recital (6) Food and Feed Regulation. 
47 Art.5 Food and Feed Regulation and Art.10 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
48 Art.6 Food and Feed Regulation and Art.11 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
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assessment harmonizes science-based regulation49 and simplifies the EU decision-making process 
for biotech foods to avoid another moratorium.50 Nonetheless, the centralisation of the risk 
assessment under the EFSA takes powers away from competent national bodies to assess foods.   
Both foods from GM plants and GEAs fall under the scope of the Food and Feed 
Regulation.51 The framework established by the Food and Feed Regulation has the merit of 
regulating similarly a variety of novel processes, i.e. bioengineering of plants and of animals, which 
create similar risks. Preapproval is necessary for GM foods before entering the EU market and 
mandatory labelling is required.52 Traditionally, the burden of proof lies with the person opposing 
an activity to prove that it is likely to cause environmental damage or threaten public health. For 
biotech foods, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof and requires the applicant to 
provide data and prove that their product does not cause excessive adverse effects on health, that 
is, their food must be safe. This fundamental shift in the burden of proof started with the 2000 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle53 and was enshrined in the General Food Law.54 
The 2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principle specifies that the principle of prior 
approval (positive list) before placing GM foods on the market is one way of applying the 
precautionary principle as it shifts the responsibility for producing scientific evidence.55 Scientific 
justification is “not required to ban a product from the market, but to gain access to the market”.56 
To this extent, the new regime could “only go so far along the road towards an overtly strong 
                                                 
 
49 However, this further integration is not without problems. See e.g. L. Levidow and S. Carr, “Europeanising 
Advisory Expertise: The Role of ‘Independent, Objective, and Transparent’ Scientific Advice in Agri-Biotech 
Regulation” (2007) 26 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 880.  
50 See European Commission, “Communication Reviewing the Decision-Making Process on GMOs” COM 
(2015)176 final; and Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the 
Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in their Territory [2001] OJ L 68/1. 
51 Foods from GEAs are produced through GM techniques which are included in the definition contained in Annex 
IA, part 1, of Directive 2001/18 and referred to in Art.2(2) of the same directive. See Directive 2001/18/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/1. 
52 In 2015, the European Commission authorised 17 GMOs for food/feed uses. European Commission, “Commission 
Authorises 17 GMOs for Food/Feed Uses and 2 GM Carnations” (European Commission, Press release, 24 April 
2015). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4843_en.htm [Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
53 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle” COM(2000) 20. 
For more on the Communication, see J.D. Graham and S. Hsia, “Europe’s Precautionary Principle: Promise and 
Pitfalls” (2002) 5 Journal of Risk Research 371. 
54 Art.7 General Food Law. 
55 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle” COM(2000) 21. 
The Communication can be seen as a precursor to the subsequent Food and Feed Regulation and Traceability 
Regulation. Precaution is also present in the fact that the marketing authorization for GM foods is renewable for ten-
year periods. This limitation puts pressure on the industry to further research GM foods and assess new scientific 
evidence as the authorization can stop or not be renewed. See Art.7(5) Food and Feed Regulation.  
56 B. van der Meulen, “Science based Food Law” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law Review 58, 71. This 
statement can be differentiated from Lee’s argument that “the restriction of a new technology needs to be justified, 
not its introduction”. See M. Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, Decision-making and New Technology 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 83. 
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precautionary approach to the regulation of GMOs and their derivative products”.57 This reversal 
of the burden of proof is based on the rationale that applicants gain financially and should bear part 
of the responsibility for risk assessment as they have access to the data needed.58 The EFSA “shares 
part of the burden […] through its responsibility to evaluate the applicant’s data”.59  
Under the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation, novel foods are preapproved and then 
included in the Union list of novel foods.60 This procedure demonstrates the application of 
the precautionary principle in the new regime.61 To assess the “novelty” of foods under the 
regulation, two criteria must be fulfilled. A novel food is “any food that was not used for 
human consumption to a significant degree within the Union before 15 May 1997”.62 It is the 
“primary element to determine whether a food” falls under its scope.63 The same cut-off date 
as the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation is used and provides continuity and certainty in the 
regulatory regime. Additionally, novel food must fall within at least one of the ten categories 
listed in Article 3 of the new regulation.  As a rule of thumb, foods are considered “novel” if 
they are newly developed, innovative, produced using new technologies and production 
methods (i.e. cloned food, cultured meat or nanomaterials) or traditionally eaten outside of 
the EU (i.e. insects).   
Critically, the regulation introduces a paradigm shift from “applicant/individual-
based” to “generic” authorizations.64 Once authorized and added to the EU list a novel food 
may be placed on the market by any food business operator. This avoids repeated new 
applications by other companies for the same novel food and should benefit in particular 
small and medium-sized enterprises.65 The new rules are expected to speed up the process to 
around eighteen months compared to three years under the current rules.66  
                                                 
 
57 N. Salmon, “What’s ‘Novel’ About It? Substantial Equivalence, Precaution and Consumer Protection 1997-2004” 
(2005) 7 Environmental Law Review 138, 148. See also T. Christoforou, “The Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms in the European Union: The Interplay of Science, Law and Politics” (2004) 41 CML Rev. 637. 
58 R. Andorno, “The Precautionary Principle: A New Legal Standard for a Technological Age” (2004) 1 Journal of 
International Biotechnology Law 11, 19. 
59 Anker and Grossman, “Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law 
Review 13, 17. The independence, transparency and objectivity of the decisions taken by the EFSA experts have 
been contested. See Levidow and Carr, “Europeanising Advisory Expertise” (2007) 26 Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 880. 
60 Art.6 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. The publication of the list could be beneficial to consumer information.  
61 Art.10 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
62 Art. 3(2)(a) 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
63 P. Coppens, “The Revision of the Novel Foods Regulation: Forget about Cloning and Nanotechnology, Let’s 
Focus on the Scope” (2013) 9 European Food and Feed Law Review 238, 246. 
64 This new procedure for application could create proprietary data issues. See e.g., C. Simpson. “Data Protection 
under Food Law Post: In the Aftermath of the Novel Foods Regulation” (2016) 11 European Food and Feed Law 
Review 309. 
65 T. Laaninen, “Updating Rules on Novel Foods to Keep up with Scientific Advances” (European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Briefing, June 2015). 
66 European Council and Council of the European Union, “New Rules on Novel Foods get Council’s Approval” 
(Press Release, 11 November 2015) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/11-novel-
foods-new-rules [Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
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The 2015 Novel Foods Regulation creates a dedicated regime for cloned foods. Cloned 
foods are specifically mentioned under Art.3(2)(a)(v) and must be authorized before being 
placed on the market. The new regulation contrasts with the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation 
where cloned foods could fall under the simplified procedure. The very distinct regulatory 
structures between cloned and GM foods before the establishment of the 2015 Novel Foods 
Regulation seemed incoherent, unsustainable and even contradictory as these two types of 
foods raise similar levels of risk.  
Labelling and traceability requirements are another expression of the precautionary 
principle.67 The GM food regulations require the mandatory traceability and labelling of products 
of GMOs, consisting of or containing GMOs and products for food produced from GMOs.68 They 
allow consumers to know what they are eating. For Lee, the labelling of GMOs in the EU is “a ‘last 
resort’ response to extreme antipathy to the new technology”.69 Indeed, part of the rationale for 
demanding traceability and labelling is that it should help restore consumer confidence in the food 
safety system by giving greater information and choice to consumers. The focus of the regulation 
is to provide information to consumers through the labelling of GM foods and the creation of a 
“safety net” based on the labelling and traceability of GM foods at every stage of the food chain.  
With regards to the labelling requirements for cloned foods, the 2015 Novel Foods 
Regulation has similar requirements as the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation. Novel foods are subject 
to general labelling requirements.70 The 2015 Novel Foods Regulation does not require the 
mandatory labelling of all novel foods because it covers both novel food technologies and 
traditional foods from countries outside the EU. As with the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation, 
Art.9(3)(b) only requires additional labelling “to inform the final consumer”.71 Informing 
consumers about cloned food could prove a critical element because such foods give rise to 
specific ethical concerns. Such ethical concerns when regulating cloned foods might be animal 
health and welfare, or more general concerns about humankind ‘playing God’.72 
Consequently, foods from cloned animals could require additional labelling. Presently, this 
is the only provision that could allow consumers to know if the food they eat comes from a 
cloned animal.  
                                                 
 
67 See e.g. Anker and Grossman, “Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms” (2009) 4 European Food and 
Feed Law Review 13, 21. For a view that labelling is a coexistence issue, see Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, 
Decision-making and New Technology (2008). 
68 Art.12(1) Food and Feed Regulation, and Art.4 and Art.5 Traceability Regulation. 
69 See Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, Decision-making and New Technology (2008) 240. 
70 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the 
Provision of Food Information to Consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 
90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 [2011] 
OJ L304/18. 
71 Art.9(3)(b) 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
72 See Gallup Organization, “Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Animal Cloning” (European Commission, October 
2008). 
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In 2013, the Commission submitted two separate proposals on animal cloning and its 
derived foods, which would strengthen precaution in relation to such foods. The Proposal for a 
Directive on Animal Cloning for Farming Purposes would provisionally ban such practices.73 This 
proposal was complemented by a Proposal for a Directive on Cloned Foods which would 
temporarily prohibit the placing on the market of these products as well as their importation.74 In 
September 2015, the European Parliament voted to strengthen the Commission’s initial proposal 
on animal cloning both in terms of substance and form. The new act proposes to ban the cloning 
of all farm animals, their descendants and products (both food and feed) derived from them as well 
as the imports of reproductive material, clones and their descendants.75 Not only does the amended 
text combine the Commission’s proposals into one but, crucially, it changes the legal act into a 
regulation to allow for direct application rather than a directive, which would require transposition 
into national legislation. The European Parliament has followed this strong precautionary approach 
towards animal cloning since 2010.76  
 If these two proposals were passed, cloned foods would not be placed on the EU market. 
Agreeing on new texts is particularly difficult as the EU, when it comes to biotechnology, has 
approached “the problem of coordinating differences among its members without erasing them”.77 
As such, there is a vast gap between intention and reality. On the one hand, EU institutions and 
consumers favour a ban on animal cloning for food consumption and their resulting products, 
while on the other hand, these products could be placed on the market without mandatory 
labelling under the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation.  
There is generally little consensus about what biotech foods regulation should be about and 
not everyone is satisfied with the establishment of specific frameworks for biotech foods. However, 
by adopting a prudent and precautionary approach, EU decision-makers have reduced the level of 
criticism.  
 
Substantial Equivalence by the Backdoor  
Despite an apparent removal of substantial equivalence within the regimes for biotech foods and 
their focus on the precautionary principle, two pathways exist for substantial equivalence to be 
                                                 
 
73 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Cloning of Animals of the Bovine, 
Porcine, Ovine, Caprine and Equine Species Kept and Reproduced for Farming Purposes, COM(2013)892 final.  
74 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Placing on the Market of Food from Animal Clones, COM(2013)893 final, 
6.  
75 European Parliament/Legislative Observatory, “2013/0433(COD) - 08/09/2015 Text adopted by Parliament, 1st 
Reading/Single Reading” (8 September 2015) 
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1401503&t=d&l=en [Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
76 Position of the European Parliament adopted at Second Reading on 7 July 2010 with a View to the Adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No .../2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Novel Foods, amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1331/2008 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001. 
77 S. Jasanoff, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science” (2006) 21 OSIRIS 273, 290. 
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reintroduced into the biotech food regimes, through the utilisation of a comparative approach and 
through gaps in the law.  
 
A Comparative Approach 
As observed, one of the two central elements of substantial equivalence is the comparative 
analysis between biotech and conventional foods. Every determination of substantial 
equivalence requires the identification of an “equivalent” product, an understanding of the 
characteristics of the biotech product and the conventional product, and a comparison of the 
two sets of characteristics, including the assessment of the similarities and differences 
between biotech and conventional foods. As such, a “comparative approach” 78 is inherent in 
the very test of substantial equivalence. This comparative approach is utilised both 
scientifically and regulatorily in the text of the Food and Feed Regulation and the 2015 Novel 
Foods Regulation.  
Certain articles in the Food and Feed Regulation and the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation 
state that a biotech food must not be “different from” or “differ from” its conventional counterpart. 
From a regulatory standpoint, Art.4(1)(c) of the Food and Feed Regulation states that GM foods 
must not “differ from the food which they are intended to replace”.79 The regulation also specifies 
that the application submitted to the EFSA shall be accompanied by “an analysis […] showing that 
the characteristics of the food are not different from those of its conventional counterpart”.80 
Additional labelling requirements for GM foods should mention any characteristic or property 
which renders a food “different from its conventional counterpart”.81 The decisive criterion for 
additional labelling of GM foods is based on a comparative approach. Under the Food and Feed 
Regulation, both the premarket authorization and labelling are underpinned by this comparative 
approach. For cloned foods, Art.7(c) of the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation asserts that where a novel 
food is intended to replace another food, the novel food to be authorized must “not differ from that 
food in such a way that its normal consumption would be nutritionally disadvantageous for the 
consumer”.82 The premarket authorization of novel foods is also based on a comparative approach.  
From a scientific stance, Article 6(3)(e) of the Food and Feed Regulation, which deals with 
the opinion of the EFSA, stipulates that “the authority examines the information and data submitted 
by the applicant to show that the characteristics of the food are not different from those of its 
conventional counterpart”.83 Similarly, under the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation, when undertaking 
                                                 
 
78 H.A. Kuiper and others, “Substantial Equivalence - An Appropriate Paradigm for the Safety Assessment of 
Genetically Modified Foods?” (2002) 181 Toxicology 427, 427 (emphasis added). 
79 Art.4(1)(c) Food and Feed Regulation (emphasis added). 
80 Art.5(3)(f) Food and Feed Regulation (emphasis added). 
81 Art.13(2)(a) Food and Feed Regulation (emphasis added). See also M. Friant-Perrot, “The European Union 
Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms and its Integration into Community Food Law and Policy” 
in L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell (eds), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 79. 
82 Art.7(c) 2015 Novel Foods Regulation (emphasis added). 
83 Art.6(3)(e) Food and Feed Regulation (emphasis added). 
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a safety assessment for novel foods the EFSA considers if the novel food is “as safe as food from 
a comparable food category” and if it “does not differ from that food in such a way that its normal 
consumption would be nutritionally disadvantageous for the consumer”.84 This comparative 
approach also includes an “as safe as” approach. Further, the emphasis is placed on health 
of the consumer, ignoring wider harm (including arising from the process of production), 
and ignoring “ethical harm”. 
In its 2008 risk assessment of cloned foods, the EFSA concluded that there was “no 
indication that differences exist in terms of food safety between food products from healthy cattle 
and pig clones and their progeny, compared with those from healthy conventionally-bred 
animals”.85 The EFSA employs a “not differing from” approach, that is a comparative approach to 
reach such a conclusion. The EFSA comparisons are made on two levels: first, with conventionally 
bred animals; and, second, with other assisted reproductive technologies.86 Such a comparative 
analysis impliedly led to cloned foods being declared substantially equivalent to conventional 
foods.87  
As noted, novel foods, including cloned foods, only require additional labelling to inform 
the final consumer under the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. Interestingly, the (absence of) 
equivalence between a novel and conventional food is the criterion for labelling.88 As cloned foods 
have been declared equivalent to conventional foods by the EFSA, they will likely not require 
labelling. Under both Novel Foods Regulations, cloned foods can be released onto the markets with 
identical labelling requirements as conventional foods because they are deemed to be substantially 
equivalent to existing foods. Therefore, the new regulation is not as precautionary as originally 
thought and overall appears as weak when failing to regulate comprehensively cloned foods. 
The EFSA itself validates substantial equivalence when assessing the safety of foods from 
GEAs. Although there is no application for premarket authorization for GEAs in the EU yet, the 
EFSA published in a proactive manner a Guidance on GEAs to establish a harmonized practice89 
and thereby reinforced its role as European scientific assessor. Most importantly, the guidance 
noticeably states that substantial equivalence is part of the comparative safety assessment of foods 
                                                 
 
84 Art.11(2) respectively (a) and (c) on the opinion of the EFSA, 2015 Novel Foods Regulation (emphasis added). 
85 EFSA, “Final Scientific Opinion on the Food Safety, Animal Health and Welfare and Environmental Impact of 
Animals derived from Cloning by Somatic Cell Nucleus Transfer (SCNT) and their Offspring and Products Obtained 
from those Animals” (EFSA, 2008) 31 (emphasis added). 
86 L. Petetin, “Clone Wars? The Challenges of Cloned Food in EU, US and WTO Law” (2009) 11 Environmental 
Law Review 246, 250. 
87 For a contrasting analysis that foresees an approval system for cloned foods, see M. Weimer, “The Regulatory 
Challenge of Animal Cloning for Food – The Risks of Risk Regulation in the European Union” (2010) 1 European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 31. 
88 Art.9(3)(b) 2015 Novel Foods Regulation states that additional labelling is required to “inform the final consumer 
of any specific characteristic […], which renders a novel food no longer equivalent to an existing food or of 
implications for the health of specific groups of the population”. 
89 EFSA, “Scientific Opinion on the Guidance on the Risk Assessment of Food and Feed from Genetically Modified 
Animals and Animal Health and Welfare Aspects” (EFSA, 2012) 7. The guidance develops risk assessment 
guidelines for foods from GEAs and indicates how to evaluate risks for food safety. See also EFSA, “Genetically 
Modified Animals” (2017) www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/gmanimals.htm [Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
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from GEAs.90 Similarly, at an international level, in its Guideline for the Conduct of Food 
Safety Assessment of foods derived from GEAs, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) 
declares that the safety assessment of foods derived from GEAs relies on the concept of 
substantial equivalence as part of the process to identify similarities and differences between 
the new food and its conventional counterpart.91 It seems that foods from GEAs revive the 
concept of substantial equivalence. 
Interestingly, the 2003 CAC principles on the risk assessment of foods derived from 
GM plants includes a safety assessment designed to identify whether a “hazard, nutritional 
or other safety concern is present” and compares a biotech food and its conventional 
counterpart by focussing on determination of similarities and differences.92 Both CAC safety 
assessments involve a comparative analysis which rely on the same elements. If the CAC 
switches between the comparative approach and substantial equivalence in its guidance 
documents, it most likely means that these concepts are treated as interchangeable. The 
foundation of both documents is substantial equivalence.  
Substantial equivalence or comparative approach, if it is indeed different, means that 
a biotech food is as safe as an existing food. There is, however, still nothing in this comparative 
approach on how different a biotech food has to be to make it not comparable to a 
conventional food. There is no specification as to when a difference becomes too great: what 
if the foods satisfy most criteria but there is a huge difference in respect of one criterion.  It 
is only in the case where there is no comparator that a comprehensive safety assessment will 
be undertaken. On this point, the CAC Guideline for Foods from GEAs states interestingly 
that, when no comparator can be selected, “a comparative safety and welfare assessment 
cannot be made, and thus a comprehensive safety and nutritional assessment of the products 
from the GM animal should be carried out”.93 This appears worrying in relation to the actual 
reliability and safety of the assessments undertaken when a comparator exists. The 
comparative approach is still limited and insufficient both scientifically and regulatorily. This 
comparative risk assessment is inadequate and undermines the precautionary approach towards 
biotech as it (re)introduces substantial equivalence and its deficiencies into the regulatory 
regimes. This is confirmed by Ghisleri and others who explained that the EU risk assessment 
methodology for GM foods, as well as those of other countries, is still based on the concept of 
substantial equivalence.94 More in depth assessments of biotech foods are needed.  
                                                 
 
90 EFSA, “Scientific Opinion on the Guidance on the Risk Assessment of Food and Feed from Genetically Modified 
Animals and Animal Health and Welfare Aspects” (EFSA, 2012) 7.  
91 “The concept of substantial equivalence is a key step in the safety assessment process”. “The expected endpoint of 
such a [safety] assessment will be a conclusion regarding whether the new food is as safe as the conventional 
counterpart”. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, “Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods 
Derived from Recombinant-DNA Animals” (CAC, 2008) 3 and 4 (emphases added). 
92 Codex Alimentarius Commission, “Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern 
Biotechnology” (CAC, 2003) 10. 
93 Codex Alimentarius Commission, “Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from 
Recombinant-DNA Animals” (CAC, 2008) 15. 
94 Ghisleri and others, “Risk Analysis and GM foods” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law Review 235, 241-247. 
15 
 
 
For Anker and Grossman, substantial equivalence no longer applies in the EU and GM 
foods can only be marketed following a full risk assessment,95 but this has proved to be only 
controversial and artificial. Levidow and others suggest renaming substantial equivalence as the 
“comparative approach”. They argue that the concept was demoted for two main reasons: to focus 
on differences between a biotech food and its non-biotech counterpart, and to no longer be used to 
justify the claim that a risk assessment is unnecessary.96 Nonetheless, it has been shown that, 
contrary to what Levidow and others argue, the concept has not been “recast” to play a diminished 
role but to strengthen its centrality in the assessment of biotech foods and to substantiate its status 
at the heart of biotech food regimes both as a scientific and a regulatory concept. The EU has not 
in reality moved away from the concept of substantial equivalence.  
 
Gaps in the Law  
Various loopholes present in the regulatory regimes for GM and cloned foods have led to the 
reappearance of equivalence in the premarket authorization and labelling of biotech foods. 
These loopholes establish an assumption of substantial equivalence of risk, and therefore of 
safety, between biotech and conventional foods. Under the Food and Feed Regulation, food and 
feed “manufactured with the help of a genetically modified processing aid” are excluded from the 
scope of the regulation.97 This means that products obtained from animals fed with GM feed and 
their resulting products, including milk, meat and eggs, are not subject to authorization, labelling 
or traceability requirements. It is assumed that these foods are “as safe as” existing foods. 
Animals fed with GM feed and their resulting foods are substantially equivalent to animals fed 
with non-GM feed even though the animals that produced these foods are a result of different 
production processes, that is, they ate different types of feed. Animals fed with GM feed become 
like a Trojan horse since animal feed accounts for a large proportion of imports of GM crops.98 
This loophole facilitates exports of GM feed into the EU. 
The 2015 Novel Foods Regulation, like its 1997 predecessor, does not require the approval, 
labelling and traceability of foods that derive from the descendants of cloned animals or imports 
of reproductive material from cloned animals.99 Such foods or imports fall outside the definition 
of a novel food. The products from the offspring of cloned animals bear the assumption that 
                                                 
 
95 Anker and Grossman, “Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms” (2009) 4 European Food and Feed Law 
Review 13, 17. 
96 L. Levidow and others, “Recasting ‘Substantial Equivalence’: Transatlantic Governance of GM Food” (2007) 32 
Science, Technology and Human Values 24, 58.  
97 Recital (16) Food and Feed Regulation. 
98 See e.g. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, “Global Status of Commercialized 
Biotech/GM Crops: 2015” (2015). 60% of the feed used in the EU is imported and imports come mainly from 
countries where cultivation is dominated by GMOs. See also European Commission, “Communication Reviewing 
the Decision-Making Process on GMOs” COM (2015)176 final 5. 
99 A recent research has shown that “every year around 30 to 40 tons of bull sperm enter the EU from the US for the 
purpose of cattle breeding”. See Testbiotech, “Cloned bulls and the implications of CETA” (EUBusiness, 10 
February 2017), http://www.eubusiness.com/Members/testbiotech/cloned-bulls [Accessed 26 May 2017]. 
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they are equivalent, i.e. they are “as safe as” conventional foods. Practically, this means that 
the possibility for a consumer to see any food labelled as deriving from a clone is extremely 
limited as it is expected that only the descendants of clones will be used in the food supply 
chain. Similarly, food from the offspring of GEAs is not mentioned in the Food and Feed 
Regulation. Therefore, they are also considered to be “as safe as” conventional foods. The 
premarket authorization and labelling of such foods are unregulated. This is interesting as in 
contrast foods from GEAs would be preauthorized and labelled.  
The 0.9 per cent labelling threshold for approved GM foods appears as another pathway for 
substantial equivalence to infiltrate in the food chain and limit the precautionary approach towards 
such foods. The labelling of foods with materials which contain, consist of or are produced from 
authorized GMOs in a proportion no higher than 0.9 per cent of the food ingredients are exempted 
from any labelling obligation, provided their presence is considered to be adventitious or 
technically unavoidable.100 Similarly as in the Monsanto case, small amounts of residues 
present in the foods do not prevent GM foods from being equivalent to conventional food.101 
GM residues are deemed safe and not requiring further safety assessment or labelling. This 
gap in labelling and traceability rules prevent the burdening of the industry but sacrifice consumer 
information.  
The gaps in the regulatory regimes emphasise the role of substantial equivalence, and 
in particular its first element that is the assumption of equivalence and risk. Certain biotech 
foods are assumed to be “as safe as” existing foods and because they are assumed to be safe 
they are unregulated. These loopholes undermine the credibility of the whole EU labelling system 
and reinforce the Trojan horse analogy. By looking more closely at the text and the practicalities 
of EU regulations, substantial equivalence is still at the heart of the regulatory process, thus 
revealing its pervasiveness. It plays a hidden and decisive role. Overall, the comparative 
approach and the gaps in the regulatory regimes indicate that the scientific and regulatory 
elements of substantial equivalence are still present today in the regulations.  
Framing regulations and assessments on substantial equivalence and its assumption that 
biotech foods are equivalent to conventional foods might have been appropriate in the early 
development of modern agricultural biotechnology but to still rely on it today appears to be 
problematic – first, because of its application to new technologies (which did not exist thirty years 
ago when the concept emerged) and their associated risks; second, the limited requirements it 
establishes, which diminish a precautionary approach towards biotech foods; and third, the growing 
consumer opposition and the limited options available to citizens to express their concerns in the 
regulatory regimes.  
 
The dominance of equivalence impacts on consumers 
                                                 
 
100 Art.12(2) Food and Feed Regulation. 
101 Monsanto case, para 84. The case appears to have created a presumption that even if there are GM residues in the 
foods, these foods are not prevented from being substantially equivalent to conventional foods.  
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The artificial approval and labelling of biotech foods establishes weak regimes, which could 
lead to potential safety problems. As observed, there appears to be a presumption that even 
if there are GM residues in the foods, these are not prevented from being substantially 
equivalent to conventional foods and they are safe to eat.102 The situation seems to be “less 
protective of human health given the uncertainty of the effects of transgenic proteins present 
in novel food”.103 This is to say nothing of the wider potentially harmful environmental 
impacts associated within the production of GM residues’. 
Although the labelling and traceability rules that exist under the Food and Feed Regulation, 
the Traceability Regulation and the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation have a positive effect in 
facilitating informed choice for consumers, the presence of substantial equivalence sustains the 
misinformation of consumers and their inability to truly choose between conventional and biotech 
foods. As noted, because cloned foods are deemed to be equivalent to conventional foods, they 
likely will not require labelling. This situation appears to contradict the preamble of the 2015 Novel 
Foods Regulation which states that the use of novel foods “should not mislead the consumer”.104 
Under the Food and Feed Regulation and the Traceability Regulation, consumers are not 
guaranteed access foods free from GMOs; at best, they are offered “food which is ‘without GMOs’, 
in the sense that any cross-contamination is light”.105 The presence of GM residues below 0.9 per 
cent does not prevent these foods from being substantially equivalent to conventional foods and 
from requiring no labelling. The “real choice” available to the consumer is limited by gaps in the 
labelling obligations.106 Consumers are most likely unaware of the existing loopholes and may 
think that they are eating foods which are 100 per cent GM-free which means that they are being 
misled.107 It seems contrary to consumer demand for “objective information” and “clear labelling” 
as stated in the preamble of the Food and Feed Regulation.108  
The regulatory uncertainty created in the framework for biotech foods contrasts with the 
certainty of the outcomes of surveys on biotech foods which show the opposition of consumers 
towards such foods. For many EU consumers, GM foods are different from their conventional 
counterparts, irrespective of their equivalence.109 Consumer resistance is even stronger in the case 
of cloned foods as the health and welfare of animals are at issue and they raise further emotional 
and ethical aspects. The vast majority of EU citizens agree that animal cloning is morally wrong.110 
                                                 
 
102 See Food and Feed Regulation and Monsanto case. 
103 R.R. Fernandez, “Monsanto and the Requirement for Real Risks in GM Food Regulation” (2006) 28 International 
& Comparative Law Review, 335, 344 (specifically referring to the Monsanto case). 
104 Recital 20 and Art.7(b) 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. There is a similar statement in Art.3(1) 1997 Novel Foods 
Regulation. 
105 M. Friant-Perrot, “The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms and its 
Integration into Community Food Law and Policy” in L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell (eds), The Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 79, 94. 
106 Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, Decision-making and New Technology (2008) 141. 
107 This appears contrary to Art.4(1)(b) Food and Feed Regulation. 
108 Recital (21) Food and Feed Regulation. 
109 The majority of EU consumers wants to know whether their food was produced using GMOs. See Gaskell and 
others, “Europeans and Biotechnology in 2010: Winds of change?” (European Commission, October 2010) 8. 
110 Gallup Organization, “Europeans’ Attitudes towards Animal Cloning” (European Commission, October 2008) 10.  
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Surveys reveal a willingness to question modern agricultural biotechnology. Positive attitudes 
towards the mandatory labelling of foods derived from animal cloning, GEAs and GM plants are 
strengthening.111 EU consumers want to know what they eat and call for transparency, traceability 
and labelling in foods. For them, the processes involved in modern agricultural biotechnology are 
not equivalent and so differ, as do their derived foods.  
The 2000 White Paper on Food Safety puts consumers and consumer information at the 
centre of EU policy by stating that consumers have the “right to expect information on food quality 
and constituents that is helpful and clearly presented, so that informed choices can be made”.112 
Labelling is one of the main tools for consumer protection and information. As stated by 
Macmaolain, as consumers have become increasingly concerned about food ingredients, it is not 
surprising that the area of EU food law that leads to the most contention is food labelling.113 
Labelling is a “crucial component of GM regulation, enabling choice on the basis of a criterion that 
would not otherwise be visible to purchasers”.114 The same is applicable to cloned foods. 
Consumers are unable to truly choose between biotech and non-biotech products and are arguably 
misled. The absence of accurate consumer choice and information for biotech foods can be sharply 
distinguished from the EU system of rules and principles aimed at protecting and improving the 
information of consumers,115 and could result in consumer ignorance, as well as potential consumer 
deception.  
Further, biotech foods generally fall under the scope of inherited statutes. This situation 
calls into question the adequacy of the existing frameworks for biotech foods to address issues 
of risk and consumer information. The Food and Feed Regulation does not expressly mention 
that it covers foods from GEAs as its establishment predates the advent of such foods. Foods from 
GEAs are regulated by an existing regime which was not designed to deal with the specific issues 
raised by this new type of food. To a similar extent, when foods derived from animal cloning 
came to the fore in 2008, they were regulated by a structure (the 1997 Novel Foods 
Regulation) that was not designed for these products and had been criticised for almost a 
decade. The Food and Feed Regulation and 1997 Novel Foods Regulation focus on food of 
plant origin, not of animal origin. Food of animal origin raise distinctive issues, like animal 
health and welfare and ethics, which are not considered under these regimes. This is also true 
                                                 
 
111 See Gaskell and others, “Europeans and Biotechnology in 2010: Winds of change?” (European Commission, 
October 2010). For instance, nine out of ten EU citizens considered it crucial that food products from the offspring of 
cloned animals be labelled. See Gallup Organization, “Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Animal Cloning” (European 
Commission, October 2008) 41. 
112 European Commission, White Paper on Food Safety COM(1999) 32. See also European Commission Directorate-
General for Press and Communication, “From Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers” (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities 2004) 14; and European Commission, “The European Union Explained - 
From Farm to Fork: Safe and Healthy Food for Everyone” (Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 
2014). 
113 C. Macmaolain, EU Food Law: Protecting Consumers and Health (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 77. 
114 Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, Decision-making and New Technology (2008) 141. 
115 This system applies to all products (including foods) made available to EU consumers. Consumer protection 
together with an “informed consumer” policy is central to EU law and policy. See Art.169 TFEU.  
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to a certain extent for the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. The regulation mentions animal welfare 
and ethical concerns but only in relation to animal testing.116 There is no reference to the use of 
animals for farming purposes.117 The regulations constitute the regulatory net for biotech foods.  
It is generally assumed that new technologies should trigger a new set of rules and a new 
framework should be created. However, foods from GEAs indicate that often the new technology 
“inherits”118  the “regulation of a previous innovation rather than benefiting from suitably updated 
legislation”, even if the new technology creates its “own specific risks and uncertainties in relation 
to scientific, environmental, safety or human health impacts”.119 This is confirmed by Lee who 
argues that “it should not be assumed that a new technology can be assessed using the tool 
that proved effective for the last technology”.120 Inherited laws are utilised to regulate new 
types of foods. The expansive application of biotech food regulations to different technologies, 
which did not exist when the regulations were drafted, limits the effectiveness of the regimes 
and proves overall to be problematic. Newer, more precautionary frameworks are needed.  
Substantial equivalence should not be present in the regulation of biotech foods as it reduces 
consumer choice and safety. From the viewpoint of the consumer, biotech foods are not 
substantially equivalent and the regulators should accommodate this. Nonetheless, moving away 
from substantial equivalence would be costly for producers and manufacturers as they would bear 
the regulatory burden of proving the safety of their products, the costs of labelling and traceability 
(including segregation and identity preservation). But, more importantly, this is an acceptable price 
to pay as such a new system would, first, improve safety as appropriate assessments would be 
made; second, establish clarity and simplicity in the system; and third, accommodate consumer 
preferences which would restore consumer confidence as the regime would be more transparent 
(which could be a benefit for producers). In the end, the entity producing the biotech food would 
bear the burden – which does not seem unreasonable. 
 
Conclusion 
It is often thought that the EU adopts a “better safe than sorry” or precautionary approach to manage 
the uncertainty created by biotech foods through the establishment of specific regimes for GM and 
cloned foods, which include premarket authorization, mandatory labelling and traceability. 
However, this precautionary approach is limited by the role played by substantial equivalence and 
the way it underpins the existing regimes.  
Both the precautionary principle and substantial equivalence still interplay in the field, 
despite an apparent and formal departure from substantial equivalence. Substantial equivalence 
                                                 
 
116 Recital 32 2015 Novel Foods Regulation. 
117 Even before its entry into force, the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation is already too weak a regime. 
118 E. Stokes, “Nanotechnology and the Products of Inherited Regulation” (2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 93, 
99. See also E. Stokes and D.M. Bowman, “Looking Back to the Future of Regulating New Technologies: The Cases 
of Nanotechnologies and Synthetic Biology” (2012) 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation 235. 
119 L. Petetin, “Frankenburgers, Risks and Approval” (2014) 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation 168, 179. 
120 Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law, Decision-making and New Technology (2008) 12. 
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was refined or recast into a comparative approach, which is utilised as the basis in biotech food 
policy and regulation. Substantial equivalence is at the heart of the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation 
and there is only an apparent “deletion” of the concept in the 2015 Novel Foods Regulation, the 
Food and Feed Regulation and the Traceability Regulation. These newer regimes indicate that the 
concept of substantial equivalence plays a decisive, underlying role in both the regulation and the 
assessment of biotech foods.  
It has been established that substantial equivalence is no longer suitable to regulate biotech 
foods because of its focus on the end-product rather than the manufacturing process. Approval 
procedures and their reliance on substantial equivalence raise issues regarding the adequacy of the 
existing regimes in effectively regulating biotech foods, especially in relation to safety assessment. 
Limited labelling and traceability requirements for biotech foods due to substantial equivalence 
result in incomplete information being given to the public and limited consumer choice, which can 
deceive and mislead them. The various regulations for biotech foods, especially for foods from 
cloned and GE animals, demonstrate the problems raised by grafting new technologies on inherited 
frameworks.  
Despite its failings and insufficiencies, substantial equivalence constitutes today embedded 
regulatory practice within biotech food regimes. The continued dependence on the concept of 
substantial equivalence (although not always obvious and straightforward) prevents the regulatory 
regimes for biotech foods from being truly precautionary. The intricate dynamic between 
substantial equivalence and the precautionary principle is a peril that undermines biotech food 
regulation and the EU food system. The EU needs to act proactively in building a reliable and 
effective regulatory environment to establish premarket approval, comprehensive labelling, 
segregation and traceability requirements, which would recognise consumer concerns and 
allow the public to take informed choices as to the foods they eat. As new modern agricultural 
food biotechnologies develop, so should the scientific assessments of these foods and their 
associated regulatory regimes.  
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